**Keynote Speaker Abstracts**

**Monique Scheer**  
University of Tübingen, Germany  
**Day 1, 10.00, L1 Lecture Theatre**

**Resituating emotions: Some happy intersections with cognitive history.**

If the history of emotions has taken the ‘practical turn’, then it should run right into cognitive history. This lecture will explore the theoretical and methodological ramifications of situating emotions beyond binaries of inner and outer, active and passive and think about where this conceptualization overlaps with a distributed understanding of mind.

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**Harvey Whitehouse**  
University of Oxford, UK  
**Day 1, 17.00, L1 Lecture Theatre**

**Histories of the mind.**

The academic world has produced two contrasting visions of the history of the mind. The first maintains that cognition and emotion are culturally constructed and historically contingent. Only by reimagining the cultural worlds of people in the past, inferred from rich historical sources, can we hope to grasp the history of the mind. The second maintains that cognition and emotion are evolved species-specific capacities, the outcome of natural selection over millions of years. To the extent that cognition and emotion are fine-tuned by cultural environments, the history of the mind is a story of major transformations in technology and social complexity that need to be quantified and compared on a global scale. This lecture highlights the disadvantages of an either/or approach and the potential benefits of combining both perspectives.

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**Gail Kern Paster**  
Folger Shakespeare Library  
**Day 2, 10.00, L1 Lecture Theatre**

**After his sour fashion: Dispositional bias and cognitive ecology in Julius Caesar.**

As John Sutton and Lyn Tribble have told us, cognitive ecologies are “the multi-dimensional contexts in which we remember, feel, think, sense, communicate, imagine, and act.” In a play like Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar - centered upon a momentous decision and its disastrous aftermath - cognitive ecology thus richly and broadly defined is, in a real sense, where the action takes place. I want to demonstrate this by focusing on two moments in the play, the moments before and after Brutus decides to join the conspiracy to assassinate Caesar. And I want to argue that if we pay close attention to the play’s cognitive ecology at these moments, we will see that the decision rests upon a marked shift in the cognitive context from keen social observation and intersubjective inference to metaphor and adage. It is this change in his way of thinking that allows Brutus to kill his intimate friend.

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**Justin E. H. Smith**  
Université Paris Diderot - Paris VIII, France  
**Day 3, 10.00, L1 Lecture Theatre**

**Who is a philosopher? Historical, anthropological and cognitive dimensions of a vaguely defined vocation.**

Is ‘philosophy’ a proper noun, describing a particular tradition descending from classical Greece? Or is it a common noun, denoting a particular human capacity that finds its inflection in all human societies? Is it more akin to ballet, a well-defined practice with a particular starting point in history, or like dance, something that human beings appear disposed to engage in simply in virtue of their anatomy and evolution? These questions are particularly important in light of recent debates about the transformation of the philosophical canon and curriculum to include non-western sources. In my talk I argue that these questions can be considerably illuminated by an interdisciplinary approach to the question, ‘What is philosophy?’, which draws, most importantly, on cognitive and anthropological considerations of the intellectual capacities and practices we think of as philosophical. I show, more particularly, that some of the most useful reflection on the extent to which philosophy may be seen as a universal and cross-cultural activity emerged in the context of the encounter between European missionaries and Indigenous intellectual traditions throughout the world.

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**Paul Yachnin**  
McGill University, Canada  
**Day 3, 15.45, L1 Lecture Theatre**

**Lear’s Conversions of Kind: Moving minds and souls in Shakespeare.**

In this paper, I consider *King Lear* in relation to what I call Shakespeare’s conversational theatre - an enterprise born in the first place from the serial conversions of the
early modern English state - and as one of the signal works of the emergence of secular modernity - a play that rethinks personhood, community, and value in a world vacated by the divine by turning toward human animality, toward thinking with nose, hand, rising heart, and naked skin rather than with mere logic and language, and toward conversion as a soul-making as well as a soul-saving act.

**Symposium Abstracts - Day 1**

**Knowledge, the resurrected body, and demonic temptation: Medieval scholastic approaches to cognition and emotion.**

**Clare Monagle**
Macquarie University
**Day 1, 11.45, L1 Lecture Theatre**

The theology of cognition: Medieval thought and ambivalent representation.

The task of western medieval theologians was to understand the relationship between the things of the world and the God that created them. Sacred Scripture bore his message. History was the record of God’s work in the world. The natural world was imbued with God’s presence. The theological project, such as it was, was to make sense of the myriad ways God inhered on earth, and to use these findings to produce doctrinal orthodoxy.

At the same time, there was much debate among scholastic theologians about the ultimate capacity of humans to know God. Was God always ineffable and entirely other, known only on the *via negativa*? Or could human cognition be deployed to understand God’s reality, his *res*? Cognition, thus, was not a neutral activity. Apprehending the world meant apprehending God, in some measure. Humans were made in God’s image, but they also bore the taint of original sin. Their cognition, then, was both aspirational and always limited.

This paper seeks to supplement recent work in medieval theories of cognition, especially that by Michelle Karnes and Robert Pasnau. I want to explore the relationship between elite understandings of cognitive processes and theologies of post-lapsarian knowledge. How does fallen man encounter the world? In this paper I will look at the role played by emotions in Aquinas’s theory of the _passiones animae_, and contextualise this within the theology of fallenness.

**Tomas Zahora**
Monash University
**Day 1, 12.15, L1 Lecture Theatre**

**Scholastic emotions and the resurrected body: The rise of the Medieval cyborg.**

Scholastic debates of the thirteenth century made a lasting contribution to Christian discourse on resurrection. Drawing on a growing literature on the nature of the soul and its properties, and stimulated by popular fascination with the Book of Revelation, scholars significantly broadened the range of questions and explanations regarding the resurrected body. In particular, the rise of a more refined understanding of affect, affections, and passions - aspects of the soul similar to the modern concept of the emotions - allowed them to investigate not only what the resurrected body would look like, but also what and how it would feel.

Their answers offer insight into complex debates on the nature of the world and the place of humans in its physical and spiritual dimensions. For Aquinas, whose work on the resurrection was among the most influential, the body would be restored to its original perfection just like the universe. But for other thinkers, notably Bonaventure, the resurrection of Christ was a sign of spiritual improvement of the universe, and the restored body would be spiritually more advanced than the original. In both cases, affect and the passions play a significant role in the transition from the fallen to the resurrected body. While Aquinas paid more attention to the framework of the passions, Bonaventure’s focus was on the affect. As a result, the glorified body could amount to a re-embodied soul, but it could also lead to the rise of a spiritual superman - an image that had could become a formidable catalyst of the popular imagination as scholastic debates made their way to lay audiences.

In this paper I will explore scholastic views of the emotions of the resurrected body through a late-thirteenth-century treatise _De consideratione novissimorum_, an extensive tractate on the four last things: death, resurrection and last judgment, hell, and glory. Composed by a Franciscan author with a skill for setting scholastic debates in a homiletic setting, the treatise offers an extensive framework for conceptualizing how a lay audience may have been introduced to the resurrected body and its emotional capabilities.
To acknowledge the difference of scholastic discourse on the passions from our understanding of the emotions, and to better outline the range of implications of the scholastic discourse, I will use Andy Clark’s work on the cyborg, which conceptualizes the body as a series of interacting clusters of organs, domains, and functions.

Juanita Feros Ruys
The University of Sydney
Day 1, 12.45, L1 Lecture Theatre

The psychopaths of the otherworld: Medieval demons and cognitive empathy.

Empathy theorists divide empathy into affective and cognitive forms where only affective empathy fulfils the criterion of sympatheic engagement with the other. Cognitive empathy, by contrast, designates an ability to understand another’s perspective without any necessity of affective engagement with that other. It has been argued that cognitive empathy fittingly describes the apparent ‘mindreading’ ability of psychopaths to enter imaginatively into others’ perspectives in order to cause them maximum harm.

There was much discussion in the High Middle Ages of how demons were able to intuit so effectively the motives and inner thoughts of humans in order to tempt them. Could demons, as spirits, somehow enter (actually) into the human mind, or could they ‘read minds’? The answer most approved by scholastic thinkers was that only God (qua the Holy Spirit) had internal access to human beings and their thoughts. However, because demons were originally angels and still retained angelic perspicacity, this fineness of perception allowed them to ‘read’ the minute outward gestures of humans that betrayed their inner thinking. Humans, roused by internal affective states, exhibited external signals of these states that could be read and acted upon by demons.

What I want to argue, then, is that in their dealings with humans, medieval demons employ a form of cognition that is highly dependent upon emotional states for providing information. In doing so, they enact what we might now term cognitive empathy, and fulfil criteria that would see them potentially diagnosed as ‘psychopaths’ according to current definitions. I would like to explore how medieval people theorized this interaction of cognition and emotion, and consider what medieval demons can tell us of the link between cognition and empathy in psychopathy.

Symposium Abstracts - Day 2

The limits of historical empathy: Experience, enactment, embodiment.
Malcolm Choat
Macquarie University
Day 2, 11.45, L1 Lecture Theatre

Forged memories, real emotions: Discourses of authenticity and the debate over fake artefacts.

The significance of the past is nowhere more evident than when its authenticity is called into question. Religious, political, ethnic, linguistic, and legal legitimacy is most forcefully expressed on the basis of historical precedent, and the past thus plays a crucial role in (de)authorising and (de)stabilising the contemporary world. At the centre of our engagement with the past thus stand issues of authenticity and forgery. This paper examines how contemporary emotional responses elicited by the often heated debates over (allegedly or provably) forged antiquities participate in wider public and academic discussions about, and understandings of, the past. In the manner and tone in which they are framed, and the wider disputes with which they are aligned, these debates demonstrate the importance of the ‘real objects’, and ‘real stories’ to both the academic community and the general public (even if these understandings and categories are subject to very different nuance within and beyond the academy). This paper asks how ‘feelings of authenticity’ are elicited by our experience of the past in stories, in objects, and in places. It considers how accusations of forgery disrupt our confidence in such cues of authenticity, and how they undermine our notion of the ‘authentic past’. As well as contributing to the debate about how memory mediates our experience of the deep past, the paper will draw out ways in which the forging of artifacts, and their detection, speaks to the importance of the past to the present.

Louise D’Arcens
Macquarie University
Day 2, 12.15, L1 Lecture Theatre

Re-enactivism? Embodied cognition, Einfühlung, and historical world-disclosure in historical re-enactment.

This paper will examine practices of historical re-enactment with a view to developing a theory of the embodied historical knowledge they produce. Existing
sociology on re-enactment has foregrounded the ethical and emotional dimensions of its amateur practice, emphasising its groundedness in pleasure, attachment, and enthusiasm rather than positivistic detachment. This then is given an ideological reading; its location outside of the academy, it is argued, constitutes a kind of refusal of institutional domestication. While the scholarship reflects a genuine desire to legitimise re-enactment, the emphasis on the ethical/emotional nature of its engagement with the past fails to come to terms with it as a specific kind of trans-historical cognition, and thus runs the risk of not taking the epistemic basis of re-enactment it seriously. In my paper I wish to ask what kind of historical understanding re-enactment rests on and perpetuates. The other element of re-enactment is still under-theorised is the bodily/experiential means by which its historical knowledge is gained. There are a number of descriptive accounts of re-enactment practices classify them variously under the headings of participatory history and experiential history, along with video and digital gaming and Live-Action Role Play gaming (or LARPS), but much of the work so far is descriptive and concerned with situating these activities within popular cultural practices. Considering re-enactment as a practice of historical understanding will augment this cultural reading.

Taking examples from such re-enactment practices as falconry, musical performance, and yarn crafts, I wish to look at how they intersect with notions of transhistorical empathy such as Einfühlung and Verstehen formulated in Romantic hermeneutic theory (including its later revisitations), and examine how these in turn might be seen to correspond with cognitive theories of extended mind. As well as exploring how reenactment practices might be illuminated by ideas of extended or embodied cognition, I wish also to consider whether ideas of embodied cognition might in turn be broadened by considering the domain of empathic history.

Thomas Bristow
The University of Melbourne
Day 2, 12.45 L1 Lecture Theatre

Mind the gap(s): Emotions, habitus, environment.

This paper unpacks some of the reasoning behind a range of dualisms and dichotomies with a view to show how current debates concerning the ‘Anthropocene’ rest upon clear definitions of geological time that have implications for emotions history, particularly when it encounters practice theory. How might the traditional ‘somatic envelope’ as understood by emotions theory, clarify a role for the 4E ontologies with respect to a more ecological framing of worlds and minds, memory and history, human and non-human? History tracks changes, memory illuminates continuities; I take this particular distinction to the question of personhood while considering whether the metaphor of the Anthropocene suggests new coordinates for the model of feelings as fully integrated experiences of emotions within the context of a subject’s private life history and social meaning structure. The Anthropocene is a proposed unit of geological time marking a break with the Holocene period. The term refers to anthropogenic environmental change, the tangible impact on Earth’s systems by human activities. In this context, embodiment and extendedness might be understood as forms of enworldment. For Heidegger, emotion and mood are an irreducible pre-theoretical background to life. With less stress placed on causality and more on possibility, this background is relative to the way in which humans and animals are situated within the world’s disclosure (material, biological formations) or the manner in which it is rendered intelligible (conceptual, artistic etc.). Such thinking helps us to locate the gaps and overlaps between anthropocentrism and the Anthropocene.

Book Symposium - Day 2

The Reformation of Emotions in the Age of Shakespeare by Steven Mullaney
(University of Chicago Press, 2015)

Day 2, 11.45, L3 Seminar Room

Steven Mullaney
University of Michigan, USA
Evelyn Tribble
University of Otago, NZ
Valerie Traub
University of Michigan, USA
Antonina Harbus
Macquarie University

The crises of faith that fractured Reformation Europe also caused crises of individual and collective identity. Structures of feeling as well as structures of belief were transformed; there was a reformation of social emotions as well as a Reformation of faith.

As Steven Mullaney shows in The Reformation of Emotions in the Age of Shakespeare, Elizabethan popular drama played a significant role in confronting the uncertainties and unresolved traumas of Elizabethan Protestant England. Shakespeare and his contemporaries—audiences as well as playwrights—
reshaped popular drama into a new form of embodied social, critical, and affective thought. Examining a variety of works, from revenge plays to Shakespeare’s first history tetralogy and beyond, Mullaney explores how post-Reformation drama not only exposed these faultlines of society on stage but also provoked playgoers in the audience to acknowledge their shared differences. He demonstrates that our most lasting works of culture remain powerful largely because of their deep roots in the emotional landscape of their times.

In this author-meets-critics book symposium session, Steven Mullaney will briefly introduce the book, before three commentators offer critical responses.

Abstracts (in alphabetical order)

Jillian Anderson
Macquarie University
Day 1, 14.45, L5 Meeting Room

The positives of being presentist: Virginia Woolf’s 1921 Representation of PTSD, a 1970s diagnosis.

This paper argues that the use of modern psychological categories in interpreting literature from the past is presentist rather than anachronistic and of an enriching rather than a limiting type. It is presentist in that the psychological categories being applied where not part of the artist’s schema at the point of creation and are being imposed on the creation, yet if this supposed ‘imposition’ broadens our understanding of the depth of engagement the art generates, then this is something to be celebrated rather than resisted or dismissed.

Broadly, this paper aims to contribute to the interdisciplinary study of the history of emotions, which recruits current historical work on mentalities, memory and narrative, and in turn, to enrich our understanding of literature from the past. More specifically, this study looks at how the reader is affected by representations of trauma and grief within Virginia Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway. By deploying specific narrative strategies, Woolf invites the reader to observe the character, the WWI veteran Septimus Smith, who suffers the trauma of war. What is striking about this novel is that Woolf accurately represents the characteristics of PTSD in her characterisation decades before the identification and nomenclature of the condition were scientifically identified. Yet the psychologically accurate narrative strategies Woolf deploys in this process work do more than ensure that the reader observes the trauma of the character of Septimus Smith with something approaching clinical precision. The strategies work to enact in the mind and heart of the reader the trauma that the character experiences. In this process, the reader is positioned to respond empathetically, and through this, invited to suspend judgment of those in trauma.

Since the aesthetic representation of trauma and its consequent grief is integral to this study, an important first move is to determine how artists create an aesthetic that ethically represents trauma. One strategy that works towards the ethical representation of trauma is the test of authenticity. By testing an artist’s portrayal of a character against the appropriate psychological discipline that pertains to that trauma, I will be positioned to ascertain whether the portrayal is authentic according to the framework of that discipline. I propose that if the portrayal is authentic, then subsequently the representation of trauma is ethical.

Virginia Woolf’s presentation of the soldier, Septimus Smith, will be considered within the frame of recent psychological research by psychologist Kitty Klein into Post–Traumatic Stress Disorder. Klein’s work on the relationship between narrative construction and mental health is instructive as it defines trauma and identifies the ordeal of (PTSD), a condition identified by clinicians only in the last few decades, and represented narratively by Woolf decades earlier. The discussion, entirely presentist in its premise, will place Woolf’s depiction of Septimus’ trauma within Kitty Klein’s current scholarship on PTSD as a way of appreciating the authenticity of Woolf’s representation, and thereby establishing its ethical nature and empathetic potential.

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Shani Bans
University College London, UK
Day 3, 11.45, L3 Seminar Room

‘All eyes and no sight’ - Shakespeare and the limits of visual cognition.

The Renaissance eye is curiously limited, as the English physician Philip Barrough notes in his The Method of Phisick (1590): ‘the eye which is wont with curious inspection to pry into all other things [...] hath bene alway blind in judging of it selfe.’ Drawing on Renaissance literary, scientific and medical treatises, this paper considers how the developments in optics influenced the representations of the cognitive eye in Shakespeare. In doing so, I will argue how the
developments in visual theory and ocular infections led to a vast system of bodies, artifacts, and elements of the built environment, revealing what Edwin Hutchins has described as “the rich interconnectivity of the brain, body, and world.” 1 By embedding cognition within material objects and cultural systems, cognitive ecology reminds us that modes of thinking are historical processes, or, as John Sutton has observed, that those “cognitive skills which individuals roam round with, more or less successfully, have histories which are just as much cultural and developmental as

building on recent work in the history of distributed cognition, I argue that cognitive ecology illuminates the way that early modern subjects thought through and about their physical surroundings, at a time when the nature of space and place were radically reimagined. Over the course of the late medieval and early modern periods, the theory of space as an a priori dimension of limitless expanse gradually supplanted the more ancient understanding of place as the intersection of bodies and locations. In this way, the early modern period represents a moment of intense negotiation over the ontology and epistemology of location, in which philosophers, theologians, chorographers, and dramatists asked what it meant to be embedded within a place. Because arguments in favour of the existence of space developed unevenly, however, I argue that the early modern period was marked by a profound sense of disorientation. By tracing the cognitive and cultural effects of this disorientation, I show, first, that place functioned as an essential component of early modern cognitive ecologies and, second, that the disruption of these cognitive ecologies reveals a historically specific interlacement of cognition and emotion within the early modern period.

In the first half of the essay, I argue that cognitive ecology restores our understanding of the historical particularity of early modern environments by showing that experiences of emplacement defined the topographies of Renaissance England. Emplacement suggests the work of thinking through an environment, a temporally extended process that cognitive ecology helps to illuminate. I then argue that early modern drama represents emplacement as the sense of being poised between different experiences of the environment, with specific plays staging the tragic consequences of inhabiting this liminality for too long. Whether in Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus or Beaumont’s The Knight of the Burning Pestle, the plays that I consider repeatedly figure moments of crisis with regard to emplacement, using disorientation within physical and conceptual space to shape the dramatic fiction. By staging this disorientation, early modern drama reveals not only the ways in which emplacement is achieved, experienced, and undermined, but also the emotional intimacy between place and personhood within early modern culture. Thus, by foregrounding the stage’s ability to represent and to manipulate the ecological nature of early modern thought, I aim to shed light on the historical relationships binding cognition and emotion together.

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Mio Bryce

Macquarie University

Day 1, 14.15, L5 Meeting Room

Emergence of hitoribocchi (aloneness) in contemporary Japan and beyond.

Emotion is an essential yet extremely elusive dimension of our mind. It may be expressed, and perceived to be intrinsic, however, it is often influenced, or even manipulated by specific socio-cultural and historical contexts. Loneliness is one such emotion.

Many people are acutely susceptible to loneliness. They fear loneliness and desperately wish to be connected and included. They also fear to be perceived as a loner, because being alone is often seen negatively. Individuals who enjoy solitude as a freedom are rarely recognised, particularly in Japan, wherein social conformity to maintain harmony prevails. Loneliness is further connected to empathy, another emotion, which is highly regarded as an essential human quality in Japanese society. When loneliness and empathy are connected and used to teach children empathy towards a loner, it potentially separates the loner as an ‘Other’ and discourages children to respectfully recognise individual differences and subjective agencies. Despite the good intention to teach altruism,
this can ironically enforce social conformity, even allowing collective bullying to thrive.

Perception and the feeling of loneliness reflect socio-cultural changes over a period of time. The weight and acuteness of loneliness has intensified since the 1980s, during which individuals experienced fading bonds with their family and community due to competitive work and study, and subsequently compounded by the economic bubble burst in the mid-90s. People lost their mental base and a clear vision of their future, hence quests for ‘true self’ became prevalent, as particularly evident in popular culture. This was further implicated and intensified due to the penetration of the Internet and the escalation of the use of mobile phones.

A cognitive turn is indicated by the emergence of key words such as hitorhibocchi (aloneness) and the cynical phrase ‘kūki ga yomenai’ (unable to read the atmosphere), or KY for short, which reveal the presence of a bleakness in the Japanese mental landscape. The term hitorhibocchi initially derived from a compound word, hitori-bōshi (one monk) and which began to be used to refer to ‘aloneness’ in the 20th century. It was typically found in children’s stories, such as Niimi Nankichi's popular short story, Gon-gitsune (Gon, the Little Fox)(1932). Today, the abbreviation of the word, bocchi, is also used among young people, indicating the pervasiveness of the concept. The popularity of such terms indicates an alarming picture of people, youths in particular, who are desperate to keep their ‘friends’ through electronic communications, therein aloneness is regarded as an unbearable misery. The vastness and ambiguity of ‘friends’ somewhat resembles the Japanese concept of seken (society, world), which easily exaggerates the fear of alienation in an individual’s mind. This phenomenon is now widely evident, even western countries, undermining the essential respect of individuals’ independence and subjective agencies. Focusing on the terms, hitorhibocchi and kūki ga yomenai, this paper will attempt to examine the cognitive transformation of loneliness in contemporary Japan and beyond.

Greg Downey
Macquarie University
Day 1, 14.15, L1 Lecture Theatre

‘Walking in Evil’ as a world: Living the thugs’ life in nineteenth century Rio de Janeiro.

Shortly after the turn of the nineteenth century, fleeing from Napoleon’s armies, the Portuguese royal court relocated to Rio de Janeiro in 1808, initiating one of the oddest chapters in European colonial history. With help from the British navy, around ten thousand Portuguese nobles, courtiers, attendants, and others resettled in what was essentially a colonial outpost, a city that had become central to the effort to control the Brazilian gold rush and the increasingly lucrative colony. At the same time, Rio was home to an enormous population of slaves and former slaves, as well as a cosmopolitan and heterogeneous mix of people from around Portugal’s far-flung empire. Until 1889, when republican forces took control, Brazil was a European monarchy in a mixed-race tropical empire.

In this odd chapter of Brazilian history, one of the most intriguing sets of characters were the capoeiras, mixed-raced gangs of urban toughs who battled to control Rio’s grey economy and, eventually, its limited democratic processes. Some formed strong alliances with nobles and became the enforcers and bodyguards of urban elites. Many of them eventually sided with the monarchists when republicans overthrew the crown, ushering in a period of severe repression of the gangs and all associated practices, including the collection of fighting techniques that came to be called ‘capoeira.’ This near-century of gang efflorescence has become central in the mythos of contemporary practice of capoeira, the Afro-Brazilian danced martial art that as seen by practitioners as heir to the traditions of the capoeiras.

This presentation seeks to explore this period – and its apotheosis in contemporary practice – as an episode of emotional history in light of the ‘ontological turn’ in anthropology. The ‘ontological turn’ is the discussion inspired by theorists Viveiros de Castro, Latour, and Descola, among others, about the necessity of grappling with other worldviews with greater integrity. Proponents of the ‘ontological turn’ argue that, confronted with ‘radical alterity,’ anthropologists should allow these ontologies to unsettle confidence in our own sense of reality while accepting that the anthropologist will never really understand the radically Other. Proponents of this ‘turn’ argue that anthropologists should write ‘as if’ others worldviews made true claims about reality. The ontological turn has reinvigorated anthropological interest in radically different worldviews, including Indigenous and mystical life worlds, but it poses significant challenges, including rendering alterity irreducible and making our relationship with science unclear.

This paper seeks to understand how we can talk about a fundamentally different experience of reality in a distant time period, especially when that time period has become mythological in the present. The accounts of capoeiras, including testimonies by some of the last remaining members of what is called the ‘heroic
generation’ of capoeira practitioners, evidence that they experienced a life world resonant with anthropological accounts of magical realities. Specifically, these accounts demonstrate an emotional tenor and pervasive mood – terror, defiance, wariness, self-aggrandisement – which suggests that, at the least, the emotional modes of recollection are distinct in affective overtone to the present. This paper argues that mood and affective patterns are constituent of historically distinct ways of being in the world, and that careful analysis may elucidate unusual patterns of emotional footing. In the case of capoeiras, to the degree that we can know, we observe an unusual pattern of hyper-arousal, autobiographical self-aggrandisement, and increased agency in a markedly hierarchical and violent day-to-day reality. We can grasp this reality without resorting to ontological claims by highlighting neuroanthropological and phenomenological explanations for radical alterity.

Willo Drummond
Macquarie University
Day 3, 14.45, L3 Seminar Room

Twentieth Century ‘Organic Form’ and the ‘Rilke Index’: Artistic cognition in the early notebook practices of Denise Levertov.

This interdisciplinary paper speaks to the recent ‘cognitive turn’ in creative writing research. Taking a Cognitive Integration perspective (as articulated by Richard Menary), it considers process writing tasks – such as the keeping of notebooks and related artifacts – as practices of artistic cognition (to borrow a term from John Sutton). Specifically, it considers the relationship between the early notebook practices of American poet Denise Levertov and her own version of mid-twentieth century revisionist organicism, ‘Organic Form’. A cognitive integration framework allows for a dynamic view of the creative writing process as an engaged and ongoing act of cognitive and embodied practice, involving a reciprocal relationship between the (historical) feeling body and the material word on the page. Throughout her life, Denise Levertov followed a practice of keeping various kinds of notebooks. In the early years of her career, one particular manifestation of these was a personal index to the Selected Letters of Rainer Maria Rilke, which she created from 1947. This paper considers the ‘Rilke index’ and Levertov’s related acts of ‘notebooking’ as practices of artistic cognition constitutive of the poet’s apperceptive poetics. As outlined in her 1965 manifesto “Some Notes on Organic Form”, Levertov privileged the felt dimension of experience. For Levertov, perception and poetic cognition were inextricably entwined with feeling, such that ‘thought’ emerged from the felt body of poet and poem. As she notably claimed: in organic poetry, “form is never more than a revelation of content”. In Levertov’s poetics, sounds and measure reflected “not the sounds of an experience… but the feeling of an experience, its emotional tone, its texture.” Drawing on work from the related fields of Embodied Cognition (Lakoff and Johnson; Varela, Thompson and Rosch), Neuroscience (Damasio) and Cognitive Science (in particular, Douglass Hofstadter’s ‘Strange Loop Theory’), this paper will explore some of the ways in which Levertov’s concept of organic from can be seen, from a creative writing perspective, and within a cognitive integration framework, to have been constituted by the bodily practices of artistic cognition involved in the keeping of her early notebooks.

Kirk Essary
The University of Western Australia
Day 1, 14.15, L3 Seminar Room

Distinguishing really knowing from merely knowing: Calvin’s Critique of “Cold” Cognition.

John Calvin, it is often pointed out, referred to faith as a “certain kind of knowledge.” But while this has occasionally been taken to mean that Calvin is at base a rationalist in his understanding of faith, or religious knowledge, Calvin in fact argues repeatedly for a conception of religious cognition that involves the affections. Although it is crucial for Calvin that the individual assent cognitively to religious propositions, he describes such assent as “more of the heart than of the brain (cordis quam cerebri), and more of the affectus than of the understanding (intelligentiae).” Affectus is typically translated as “disposition” in this passage, but in the context of other similar statements made by Calvin, it clearly has a more explicitly emotional valence than the usual rendering allows. The Gospel ought, Calvin continues in the same section of the Institutes, “to penetrate the inmost affections of the heart, take its seat in the soul, and affect the whole man a hundred times more deeply than the cold exhortations of the philosophers!” Coldness, and frigidity are terms repeated often by Calvin in his excoriations of what he deems to be ineffective academic theologizing, and they imply, of course, non-affectivity. As William Bouwsma once wrote, “Here then lies the significance of Calvin’s frequent attacks on frigidity; knowing, for Calvin, was frigid if it lacked that involvement of the affections which distinguishes really knowing from merely knowing.”
A balanced faculty psychology, along with an understanding of religious epistemology that must leave room for emotions, is borne out in several other statements Calvin makes in the Institutes, many of which seem in fact to privilege the affective over the intellective aspect of the person. “The Word of God,” Calvin writes in the Institutes, “is not received by faith if it flits about in the top of the brain (in effect cerebro volutatur), but when it takes root in the depths of the heart (in ino corde radices egit) that it may be an invincible defense to withstand and drive off all the stratagems of temptation.” Calvin moreover writes that the gospel “is not apprehended by the understanding and memory alone (intelluctu memoriaque), as other disciplines are, but it is received only when it possesses the whole soul (totam animam), and finds a seat and resting place (receptaculum) in the inmost affection of the heart (intimo cordis affectu).” Affectivity thus lies at the very heart of Calvin’s conception of religious knowledge, and this has implications for a number of other areas of his thought. Given especially his impact as a religious thinker, this aspect of his thought provides an important test case for exploring the relationship of emotion and cognition in the early modern period. Thus, in this paper I explore the significance of Calvin’s endorsements of affective religious knowledge in the broader context of sixteenth-century Christian humanist thought, with attention to the implications of these formulations for reconstructing early modern psychologies. Finally, I argue that Calvin is operating in a widespread intellectual milieu consciously developed in Renaissance Christianity as a reaction against “scholastic” conceptions of religious epistemology.

First, we present two case studies of the most successful achievements of scholastic analysis, the development of ideas on continuity (leading to calculus) and probability. In both cases, success was achieved through conceptual analysis of inchoate common conceptions concerning (respectively) motion and the grading of evidence. These analyses (with the addition of some formulas in the late seventeenth century) have become important parts of modern mathematics.

After a brief look at the ways in which the same scholastic method had success in such areas as legal theory, economics and logic, we consider the scholastic analysis of the mind itself.

The key figures in turning medieval theoretical attention to the mind were Ibn Sina, with his complex set of cognitive faculties, and Abelard, with his emphasis on intention in ethics. These and the later scholastics – the true “folk” of “folk psychology”, as is evident in the Latinate vocabulary of the inner life - created an introspection-based theory of the mind which proved serviceable for centuries, and still does in, for example, pop psychology and literature.

We look particularly at the theory of the imagination, the faculty of recombining images from memory, and its use in the early scientific revolution as a virtual test-bed for theories. Galileo claimed, with some plausibility, that he could discover laws of motion there without needing to perform physical experiments.

Throughout, a more positive attitude than usual is taken to the abilities of introspection and conceptual analysis to create genuine knowledge.

James Franklin
The University of New South Wales
Day 3, 14.15, L5 Meeting Room

Knowledge through introspection: The genius of the scholastics.

Some subjects do not lend themselves to knowledge through introspection and analysis of concepts - chemistry, for example, where there is no choice but to experiment and observe. Many others do - some kinds of psychology and mathematics, philosophy, logic, linguistics, legal theory, economics - and it was those disciplines that were the strength of late scholastic thought in the period 1300-1650.

The paper briefly surveys some of these achievements, with special attention to medieval faculty psychology and its classification of cognition, emotions and moral qualities of the soul such as virtues and vices.

Marcelle Freiman
Macquarie University
Day 2, 12.45, L5 Meeting Room

‘From sensibility to emotion: Enabling extended cognition through formal constraint in Coleridge’s revisions to the ‘Sonnet to the Rev. W. L. Bowles’ (1794, 1796).’

This paper is part of a project that brings theories of externalised cognition and extended mind to a study of the art of creative and literary writing. The main interest of this project is the activity of the writer and the making of the text, rather than on literary reading, although knowledge of literary history and textual analysis necessarily inform the project. Having established the value of writers’ drafts and revisions as examples of cognitive practice and externalised...
The focus of this paper is on the role of form in poetry - in particular, the role of formal and material constraint - in the composition, cognitive and affective activities and language choices discernible in the author’s revisions to Coleridge’s sonnet ‘To the Rev. W. L. Bowles.’ Coleridge’s early career was marked by his participation of the 18th c. so-called ‘Sonnet Revival’. Despite evidence of Coleridge’s ambivalence as to the value of the sonnet form for the expression of emotion or sensibility, during the period 1794-97 he invested energy in writing and publishing these poems and aligning himself with others who did so, such as William Southey, Charles Lloyd and Charlotte Smith. Although he later wrote far fewer sonnets, focusing on other forms as was the historical convention, at this time he was especially interested in distinguishing himself from the sentimentality of feeling and perceived ‘feminization’ of conventional sonnet-writing’s language and diction. He aligned himself strongly with the work of William Lisle Bowles and other poets whose sonnets were oriented to social and political concerns, rather than focusing the private, individual feelings, which Coleridge doubted were worthy of public poetry. In line with the search for a ‘masculine’ poetic form and expression of emotion, Coleridge championed Bowles whose influence he claimed and whose sonnets he admired. Coleridge’s sonnet ‘To the Reverend W. L. Bowles’ was published as part of his series of ‘Sonnets on Eminent Persons’ in 1794 in the Morning Chronicle, and appeared in revised form in his Poems on Various Subjects (1796).

In an examination of these two versions of the poem, this paper argues that the poetic form acts as a scaffold for externalised cognition. Rather than controlling emotion, the metric, linear and holistic form of the sonnet enables the cognitive and conceptual development of the work in mobilising emotion to its full realisation through a process of expansion and increased depth through linguistic resonance, rather than contraction or suppression. The paper further examines the enabling role the poetic formal structure in the historical context of constraints of materiality, such as scarcity of paper, in this writing as ‘deterioralised’ extended cognition both inside and outside the body. The paper thus draws on existing EM theory, embodied cognition, affect theory, neuroscientific research on cognition, and manuscript archival research.


Sandra Garrido and Jane Davidson
The University of Melbourne
Day 1, 12.45, L3 Seminar Room

Integrating historical and psychological perspectives on emotion and music: A case study from Monteverdi.

This paper combines historical analysis and empirical research techniques, arguing that music, in its capacity to divulge extra-linguistic information about emotional expression, is uniquely situated to illuminate the ‘mechanics of feelings’ across time and space.

Research on emotions in music has tended to belong to one of two divergent streams: one led by universalist premises, which focuses on the biophysical manifestations and cognitive mechanisms of emotional response; and the other based on constructionist perspectives of cultural anthropology and history which tend to concentrate on the formulaic expression of emotion in music as it is found in different contexts and times. The current project offers a cross-disciplinary approach, integrating a history of emotions framework with viewpoints from music psychology, in which psychological responses to a live music performance are examined in the light of both the historical contexts in which the music was created, and the context in which it is heard today.

A modern-day performance of Monteverdi’s Il Combattimento di Tancredi e Clorinda (1638) offers a case study for investigation. The work was originally created according to principles developed by Italian humanist Girolamo Mei. In application, Monteverdi composed a work rooted in an understanding of the human mind as possessing three principal passions or affections, including anger, temperance, and humility.
or supplication, which he correlated to the high, medium and low ranges of the human voice. He employed two broad compositional approaches: genere concitato, designed to imitate and display the bravery and anger of men going into battle, which in turn falls within his broader style of composition described as seconda pratica, in which the music is designed to enhance the emotional content of the text.

In our study, we draw on Monteverdi’s contextual understandings of emotion and its expressions through musical structures with the aim of accessing the meanings and understandings that existed in the seventeenth century. Adding modern psychological understandings of emotion and cognition enables us to investigate how modern day configurations of thought and action might approximate historical experience. So an opportunity to build a theoretical bridge between modern and historical cognition is afforded. Through these means, a psycho-historical model for understanding emotional response to music is developed. The work expands Patrik Juslin and Daniel Västfjäll’s eight mechanisms of emotional responses to music that emerge from biological processes and social constructions in a rich and complex cognitive model.

Andrew Gillett
Macquarie University
Day 2, 11.45, L5 Meeting Room

Moving minds with pre-modern media: Emotion, communication, and distance in late antiquity.

In the contemporary world, minds can be moved and emotions engaged, at levels beyond one-to-one interpersonal relations, through the aggregated modelling of impersonal broadcast media or the pressure of semi-individualised social media, which act as proxies for both personal and social-group contact. In the pre-electric age (i.e. before the telegraph, the first form of verbal communication over distance removed from human accompaniment), communicative media were more restricted and inescapably physical: written documents, human beings, physical artifacts. Nonetheless, cognitive changes and shifts in emotional commitments on vast societal scales occurred repeatedly throughout the pre-modern historical period: the sweeping changes accompanying the rise and fall of several universal religions as the exclusive bases for social organisation and individual belief-systems from the 4th to 18th centuries, and the emergence of scientific, ‘empirical’ mentalities in medieval Islam and early modern Europe, are prominent examples. Though the world may be smaller now, in the past distance did not preclude the potential of individuals or institutions to affect change to hearts and minds.

Research on such changes conventionally deals better with what changed than how it changed. This in part arises from traditions of scholarship and academic habitus, and in part from epistemology: the past, by definition, cannot be studied through the actual application of synchronic methodologies of research which might observe processes in action. For the most part, we can attempt to access the past only through imaginative reconstruction deploying objects that historians regard as utilitarian ‘sources’ but which might less solipsistically be regarded as randomly surviving detritus: written texts and artifacts. Both are hugely problematic: written texts are not self-explanatory but are themselves only a textual residue of far more complex enactments of communication; artifacts are inherently mute. But again, texts and artifacts demonstrably wrought changes in past societies.

This paper will consider one type of text that often explicitly declared its function to be the engagement of both cognition and emotion: the not-so-simple letter. Ancient, Medieval, Byzantine, and Islamic letters

Stephen Gaukroger
The University of Sydney
Day 2, 15.15, L5 Meeting Room

Sensibility, mesmerism, and the decline of anthropological medicine.

French Lockean sensationalists of the early 18th century argued that reason provides us with no access to an external world: it is essentially a solipsistic world of inner mental states. Sensibility, by contrast, in making us aware of the affective states of others, puts us in contact with a world different from ourselves. Late in the century, mesmerism directed its attention to these affective states, but what the committees set up to investigate mesmerism found was that our relation to the world via sensibility was unreliable. Consequently it could not be used to break out of the solipsism that a purely rational understanding of the world was thought to commit one to.
developed multiple tropes asserting and theorizing their function as substitutes, not alternatives, for person-to-person emotional and intellectual contact; that is, the author and recipient were understood as actually meeting in the medium of the letter, and experienced the real emotional reactions attendant on physical interaction. These tropes were characteristic of communications between members of aristocracies, and particular variations were developed in individual sub-cultures, such as religious communities. Traditional historical scholarship has approached such tropes through literary criticism, analysing them for example as rhetorical devices functioning as social markers of elite education, rather than contending with their claims to enact real personal contact and emotional experience. Only recently has scholarship begun to approach these materials with the tools of Communication and Network Theory, let alone examine them as examples of Distributed Cognition that function through social networks of which letter exchange is the manifest evidence.

Looking primarily at examples from my period of research, Late Antiquity, the paper will discuss first the components of the ‘communicative package’ of which the textual documents of letters formed only part, including the semiotic function of gifts and, especially, the human agency of the letter-bearer (who might provide a range of interactive communicative functions, from dramatic performance of the letter, delivery of accompanying oral message, and enactment of ritual, to representational messages of social status and social or institutional networks). Secondly, the paper will consider examples of letter exchanges in which the focus of communication is on the emotional impact of the act of communication itself, before proceeding to consider to what extent such documents offer contemporary researchers opportunities for capturing real processes of change in cognition or affect from the past, and what methodological considerations might guide the historian seeking to elucidate ancient texts with contemporary models, or the cognitive scientist seeking pre-modern evidence of change in cognitive or emotional phenomena.

Simon Goldhill
University of Cambridge, UK
Day 3, 14.45, L1 Lecture Theatre

Rejoicing at the death of a child: Conversion and emotion.

In this paper, I look at a particular moment in the 19th century when a mother celebrates the death of her eldest and much beloved child, because he is, she avers, in heaven -- an emotional response that her husband and family could not match. I relate this to her particular religious conversion, and set this in the context of normative responses to mourning. This raises a question of what sorts of cognitive dissonance are prompted by conversion, when religious principles are understood literally (rather than as sites of lived experience and compromise) -- and what such literalness means for social understanding.

R. A. Goodrich
The University of Melbourne/Deakin University
Day 3, 12.45, L1 Lecture Theatre

Cognitive narratology: Confronting disorderly emotions in William Godwin’s Caleb Williams [1794].

Two related issues underpin this paper: (a) whether or not literary historical and cognitively scientific enquiries into the emotions have a sufficiently common language to be mutually illuminating, and (b) the extent to which literary historical analyses aim to disclose the intelligibility of past emotions whereas cognitive scientific investigations aim to account for their causal mechanisms. This paper will particularly focus upon cognitive narratological analyses over the last two decades which have explored historical examples of prose fiction as the medium par excellence for representing and expressing affective experience. It is a trend led by such theorists as Monika Fludernik, David Herman, Alan Palmer, and Lisa Zunshine.

In the time allocated, we shall examine a small set of crucial presumptions largely common to this quartet of cognitive narratological theorists. Their key presumptions include: (i) the past literary practice of writers focuses not only upon the individual minds and emotions of protagonists, but also upon their so-called social or collective minds; (ii) the apprehension of both individual minds and social or collective minds, whether by fictional figures and narrators or by actual writers and readers, basically involves the same set of
ahistorical, cognitive processes; (iii) the cognitive processes involved in the apprehension of other minds within prose fiction ultimately imply that fictional figures and actual persons exercise the same “theory of mind.”

For illustrative purposes, we shall refer to the still popular work by the philosopher-novelist William Godwin, Caleb Williams (1794), a novel first appearing during a period notable for marked transitions in the subject-matter and expressive techniques of the literary arts in late eighteenth-century Britain. The novel has certainly puzzled generations of readers: Is it, for instance, a self-reflexive confessional? Is it a nascent detective story? Is it a disguised political tract? In short, Caleb Williams has been chosen because its contested status and hence the depiction of its protagonists acts as a pointed test-case for theorists of cognitive persuasion.

We shall argue that three characteristics emerge when cognitive narratology confronts disturbed affections, emotions, or passions in Godwin. Firstly, it basically operates by appealing to theories of emotions upholding causal intelligibility at the expense of those enriching literary historical intelligibility. Secondly, it overwhelmingly tends to treat past conceptions of the emotions merely as precursors of notions and theories nowadays. Thirdly, it resorts at the very least to stipulative definitions of the emotions and accompanying behaviour under the guise of summarising findings of the cognitive sciences. As a result, cognitive narratology for all its promise is thwarted in its attempt to navigate between cognitive scientific perspectives on what makes emotions possible and literary historical ones on what fictive emotions make possible.

Madiha Hannachi
University of Montreal, Canada
Day 1, 12.45, L5 Meeting Room

Dearly arabized Shakespeare: Emotional conversion and reappropriation in the history of Arab adaptations of Shakespeare.

In “Bodily Motion, Emotion and Mind Science,” Jordan Zlatev studies the close etymological and semantic relations between the terms ‘motion’ and ‘emotion’. He calls this linkage ‘affectivity’. I suggest that Arab adaptations of Shakespeare are a form of affectivity. First, adaptation entails a movement between languages, cultures, historical eras, and geopolitical contexts. These movements have also a strong emotional dimension. Change in playing venue involves a change in how the play is understood and felt. Zlatev argues that affectivity is “public, and affects others, at various levels of awareness. In moving ourselves, we move others; in observing others move—we are moved ourselves”. This ‘intersubjectivity’ is, thus, at the heart of the experience of theatregoing. The theatre house is a public space where audiences with diverse subjectivities and emotional backgrounds share a common experience. The performance in all its materiality (the props and the characters’ movements on stage) becomes a device to move the audience. Through the history of Arab performances of Shakespeare’s plays, I will show how language and the stage props, mainly costumes, not only highlight the Arabness of the adaptation, but also make sure that the audience “feels as an Arab” (in critic Jabra Ibrahim Jabra’s terms). For instance, in Sulayman Al-Bassam’s adaptation of Richard III, which toured the world’s stages, Margaret’s dress is made of multiple colored layers with words in Arabic, such as ‘History’, ‘revenge’, and ‘curse’, scattered on the cloth. Following Jabra’s argument, the audience members who speak Arabic and consequently feel as Arabs would be moved much more than other audience members who can do no more than follow the simultaneous English translation on a screen. In my paper, I will show how intersubjectivity operates within the frame of transcultural adaptation of Shakespeare, especially because in such adaptations language, history, and socio-political paradigms are in constant motion.

The transcultural adaptation of Shakespeare by theatre practitioners means that his characters, formerly considered as “Other”, are now members of the community of Arab-Islamic culture. Among these characters are Othello, renamed Utayl and Caliban, renamed Ghalban. Utayl has indeed become is a popular name across the Arab world thanks to Arab adaptations of Shakespeare’s Othello. This popularity is an outcome of centuries of cultural reappropriation of the Moor as a national emblem. The issues of class and tribal belonging supplant the issues of colour and race which formerly defined Shakespeare’s Jacobean play. Arabized Othello’s attachment moves from an underrepresented racialised counter-public to a recognized predominant public. Thus, Othello is now received in the Arab world as a “brother” coming back from hostile Europe. Arab adaptation allows local audiences to cognitively and emotionally identify with racialised characters from a European milieu as fellow members of their own community. The theatre becomes the site for the homecoming of these racialised characters, a place to which they return to tell their story from a radically transformed perspective.
This process of cultural reclamation is juxtaposed with another process of cultural conversion. Hamlet, an emblem of philosophical and political Eurocentricity, is now embraced as an emblem of the ineffectual Arab intellectual. Although Hamlet’s name was not Arabized, the character enjoys a privileged intellectual status. He is regarded as a touchstone for philosophical and moral dissidence in a “rotten” Arab political context. In such a postcolonial and, in some cases, decolonial context, Arab intellectuals identify with Hamlet as a dissident philosopher. Arab audience, however, aspires to his moral flawlessness and his uncompromising stance on honour.

The Bard himself was the target of Arabization, either in jest or seriously, since the end of the nineteenth century. Writers and scholars, such as Ahmad Faris Al-Shidyaq and Safa’ Khulusi, and late Libyan leader and poet Kaddafi claimed Shakespeare’s Arabness. His name became Shaykh Zubayr. The term “Shaykh” denotes a respected status due to wisdom and/or advanced knowledge. On the one hand, Shakespeare’s Arabness subverts the tradition which considers the Bard as the cultural division of the expanding British Empire; on the other hand, it corroborates cognitive admiration and emotional attachment to a wise intellectual.

In this paper, I show how intersubjectivity operates within the frame of transcultural adaptation of Shakespeare where notions like language, history, and socio-political paradigms are in constant motion. Shakespeare, through transcultural performance, brings together cognitivism (the characters’ bodies and emotions) and intersubjectivity (the audience’s sociality and culture). To study the mechanisms of Arab intersubjectivity, I examine the history of Arab adaptations of Shakespeare as a cultural conversion and reappropriation. I suggest that undertaking such a process of cultural conversion and reappropriation implies the adapter’s and the audience’s cognitive and emotional involvement with the characters and the Bard himself. Cultural conversion applies to elements considered emblems of Europe’s hegemony philosophically and politically. On the philosophical level, I argue that Arab adaptations of Shakespeare try to restore the centrality of the poet as the quintessential producer of meaning in a way to replicate the predominance of old Arabic poeticas supreme maker of ideals. On the political level, conversion embeds the characters and the plots in total immersion in an Arab context with specific issues related mainly to local governance and foreign interference. Cultural reappropriation, however, applies to racially underrepresented characters, formerly considered as Others. I examine the identity shift whereby these Others in the past are now reintegrated as predominant Selves into Arab-Islamic culture.

Antonina Harbus
Macquarie University
Day 3, 12.15, L1 Lecture Theatre

Emotional reasoning in Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales - A case of cognitive literary history.

Geoffrey Chaucer captured the attention and admiration of both his medieval English audience, and also many audiences since the late-fifteenth-century publication of The Canterbury Tales, through a narrative technique that pivots on the compelling and entertaining representation of emotional reasoning. Chaucer personalises the portrayal of individual emotional and cognitive histories through his differentiated pilgrim-storytellers who are identifiable and memorable individuals engaging in idiosyncratic behaviour and autobiographical remembering via a particularly large range of narrative styles. He also generalises embodied emotional registration and reaction by presenting these pilgrims as representatives of contemporary professions, classes, and genders that behave according to type, and frequently prioritise material needs or corporeal desire over other considerations. These narrators are collected into a communal cross-section of human interaction and experience via the pilgrimage frame that binds the tales into a mega-narrative. The rationale for the tales - to while away the time on a long journey from London to Canterbury - embeds entertainment and emotional variation into the framework, as well as the individual tales and their joining narratives.

This paper will argue for the value of considering this long and enormously popular text within the conceptual frame of a specifically cognitive literary history of the English Middle Ages, by tracing the way in which emotional histories and emotional reasoning are instantiated in imaginative literary form. The focus on entertainment in particular in The Canterbury Tales relies on the presentation of narratives that depict complex cognitive, ethical, and social situations, and sustained and detailed reasoning undertaken by a large range of characters undergoing various kinds of change. Most interestingly, the tales position the reader to expect high or low drama, story twists, and, as the tales progress, a pattern of emotional transformation - with humorous, moralistic, didactic, moving, repelling, and other results that keep variation at the forefront.
Given the huge success and wide readership of this text (one of the first books printed by Caxton and available via mass distribution), its role as a record of the range of cognitive and emotional experience of its time is significant, including in the way it arouses and meets expectations in its readership by means of the entertaining and emotional-cognitive ballast of the narratives, even those that seem frivolous, scatological, or obscene. The inbuilt commentary provided by the other pilgrims in the joining narratives provides a line of interpretation that keeps the focus on the dynamics of change in human emotional and cognitive life at all social and experiential levels.

Using this single instance of complex representation, this paper will consider the value of literary texts, especially the high-impact or ‘classic’ ones like The Canterbury Tales, in broader considerations of histories of cognition and emotion.

Marina Harvey, Chris Baumann, Vanessa Fredericks
Macquarie University
Day 1, 12.15, L5 Meeting Room

Cognition, emotion and reflection for learning in higher education.

Reflection for learning is an embedded pedagogical practice across many subjects and many higher education institutions. Both the practice and documentation of reflection for learning has traditionally maintained a cognitive focus, as exemplified through a reliance on text-based journaling. Historically, this can be explained by the impact on the field of education by the seminal work of Bloom and colleagues (1956) on the cognitive domain. In turn, existing taxonomies of reflection have also focused on the cognitive domain.

Coding of student reflective texts (n=760) from four sites (Australia, Denmark, Hong Kong and South Korea) presented a conundrum as student engagement with reflective practice was not constrained to a cognitive process only. Evidence of the engagement of the affective domain was apparent and could not be ignored. It was necessary to delve into the history of emotion and revisit the companion handbook, to Bloom’s first volume, which focused on the affective domain (Krathwohl, Bloom & Masia, 1964). With recognition of the role of emotion in reflection for learning, the taxonomy developed by Krathwohl, Bloom and Masia provided a foundation for developing and empirically testing a new dual-coding ‘emo-cog’ taxonomy. The ‘emo-cog’ taxonomy is introduced together with a discussion of its application for analysing the relative contribution of cognition and of emotion to student reflection for learning.

Laurie Johnson
University of Southern Queensland
Day 2, 14.15, L3 Seminar Room

Sallow Hal: Reflecting sadness in the Henriad.

There is a movement from William Shakespeare’s 1 Henry IV that passes through the second part and culminates in Henry V, relating to the emergence of young Prince Hal from his misfit ways to the throwing off of the corrupting ties to Falstaff and the embrace of kingship. The movement is presaged early in 1 Henry IV in the Prince’s “herein I will imitate the sun” speech (1.2.194-214), which makes it easy for critics to read all of Hal’s subsequent actions according to a set plan. There is a risk in this conventional reading of the plays that the emotional range of these actions as they unfold within the drama is flattened out. Yet even in outlining his plan, Hal is drawn into a language of emotion - this, I suggest, is to some extent precisely because his is a plan based on a transformation in appearances. He compares his reformation to that displayed by “bright metal on a sullen ground,” which “Shall show more goodly and attract more eyes / Than base contagious clouds” (1.2.194). The company he keeps, being “sullen” in his description, is marked by ill-humour. His earlier description of his imitation of the sun refers to the same company as “base contagious clouds” (1.2.195). In describing what should be his later triumph, then, Hal also spells out the mechanisms by which exposure to people of ill-humour will bear him down as well. The subsequent movement is thus not simply playing out Hal’s masterful plan over the greater part of three whole plays; rather, it is one in which a reflection of sullenness is shown to be the catalyst for the Prince’s own descent into sadness, upon which much of the action (or, rather, inaction) of 2 Henry IV centrally focuses. In this paper, I shall argue that the depth of the Prince’s sadness in the second play is more than the immediate circumstantial grief he experiences in response to his father’s death—the response is already shaped by the contagion to which he has exposed himself through his plan for self-transformation. In keeping with Erin Sullivan’s important recent work on sadness and self in early modern England, I will argue that Hal’s sadness is not a straightforward representation of melancholy, for example, but I will seek to add to Sullivan’s work by suggesting that in its theatrical treatment of Hal’s plan for transformation, Shakespeare’s second tetralogy poses a challenge to its audience in relation to observing sadness in its various forms.
Divergent valuations of the cognitive impact of desire in Plato’s philosophy of love and early modern treatises on love sickness.

Plato describes love madness, or mania - a term still in psychiatric use to denote an unnaturally heightened state of mind marked by periods of great excitement or euphoria, delusions, and overactivity - by way of a list of symptoms (Phaedrus, 251d) which recur in numerous proto-medical treatises on love sickness over subsequent centuries. Plato allocates love madness the highest status of all divine madnesses (prophetic, mystic and poetic are the other three, Phaedrus, 265b) - a high valuation due, in the large part, to the linking of the mania with inspiration (enthusiasmos), an increase in the cognitive and creative functions of the lover under its influence (Phaedrus 245a). Plato sees this enhancement as the philosophical purpose behind the suffering associated with other symptoms of love madness.

By contrast, pre-modern medical treatises on love madness and melancholy (Constantine the African, Andreas Capellanus, Bernard de Gordon, Jacques Ferrand, Timothy Bright and Robert Burton, amongst others), still describe love madness using Plato’s symptoms, but with a consistently negative valuation of the condition as a cognitive impairment and advocate prevention and aggressive treatments.

In this paper, I propose that the divergent valuations of the cognitive impact of love madness constitute the fundamental difference between Platonist philosophy of love madness on one hand, and pre-modern medical treatises no the other, both otherwise based on the same set of symptoms, and suggest that divided views on the cognitive effects of desire persist to this day. I will discuss some historical reasons for the axiological change, and examine the two valuations in the light of results of modern-day neurological and behavioural research on the cognitive impact of desire.

In the course of his lengthy apology on behalf of the liturgy of the Elizabethan Book of Common Prayer in the fifth book of his treatise Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie (1597), Richard Hooker (1554-1600) develops a distinctive hermeneutical argument whereby “that which inwardlie each man should be, the Church outwardlie ought to testifie. And therefore the Duties of our Religion which are seene must be such as that affection which is unseen ought to be. Signes must resemble the things they signifie.” Hooker’s distinctive hermeneutics of signs and signification constitutes a key strategic device in his theological polemics addressed to critics of the religious settlement of 1559. According to Hooker “Duties of religion performed by whole societies of men, ought to have in them accordinge to our power, a sensible excellencie, correspondent to the majestie of him whome we worship. Yea, then are the publique duties of religion best ordered, when the militant Church doth resemble by sensible means, as it maie in such cases, that hidden dignitie and glorie wherewith the church triumphant in heaven is bewtified.” (Lawes V.6.2; 2:33.26-34.6) The aim of this paper is to explore the hermeneutics underpinning the sensuous forms of public worship employed in the later Elizabethan Church together with the apologetics which aimed to secure their conscientious acceptance by a sceptical puritan public.

“Turn back”: Repentance as a cognitive and affective process in Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure.

At Measure for Measure’s “pivotal moment”, Isabella twice urges Angelo to “turn back” (2.2.148, 150). She is pleading with him to reverse his judgement that will ensue in her brother’s execution, but her illocution is more germane than she intends. Turning back

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The Reformers chose “repentance” to replace “penance” to explicate how God’s forgiveness is attained. “Penance” does not occur at all in the 1560 Geneva Bible or the Authorized Version, while it appears fifty-nine times in the Roman Catholic Douay-Rheims New Testament alone. This linguistic change marked a decisive theological and ensuing experiential transformation. Whereas in medieval Roman Catholicism penance included external works as satisfaction for temporal guilt associated with sin, was mediated by priests, and by the Council of Trent was officially recognised as a sacrament, the Reformers asserted that repentance was a transaction between a repentant person and God – involving the mind, heart and will – and repudiated the classification of penance as a sacrament.

Immediately after Isabella exhorts him to “turn back” (and exits) Angelo voices the first of two soliloquies in which he struggles with repentance. Within the structure of the play they are interrupted by a brief scene (act two, scene three) in which the now-disguised Duke discusses Juliet’s repentance with her. “Repent you, fair one, of the sin you carry?” the former asks the latter (2.3.19). This focus upon repentance, especially the Deputy’s subjective, spiritual struggles with it in his soliloquies, constitute the climax of the dramatic tension in Measure’s early acts.

It will also be the point of interest in my paper, in which I hope to show that Angelo’s unwillingness to embrace both the cognitive and affective aspects of “mortification” – that is, a distinctly Protestant form of repentance – and thus his want of “vivification”, drive him to enact the tyranny he threatens (2.4.170).

Kathleen Perry Long
Cornell University, USA
Day 3, 14.15, L3 Seminar Room
Using cruelty to teach empathy in Théodore Agrippa d’Aubigné’s Les Tragiques.

The late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries in France were dominated by the Wars of Religion between Catholics and Protestants, in the course of which as many as two million people died. These wars were characterized by unprecedented cruelty in the form of widespread massacres and new forms of torture and execution. Such violence increasingly became a spectacle or entertainment, whether in the form of public executions in which the public was encouraged not to empathize with the victims, or theatrical productions that represented horrific violence in classical or contemporary contexts. In this context, a number of authors, among them Michel de Montaigne, expressed concern about the cultural validation of cruelty, and meditated on how a more ethical stance towards religious and cultural difference might be inculcated in an increasingly cruel population. One possible solution was to find ways to make people understand or even feel the suffering of others, rather than remaining merely spectators, and thus induce them to engage with others in a more ethical and sympathetic manner. I would argue that this is the effect that Théodore Agrippa d’Aubigné is seeking in some of the more controversial passages of his epic about the Wars of Religion in France, Les Tragiques (The Tragic Ones). While Agrippa d’Aubigné was a leader of the Protestant or Huguenot faction, he denounced all forms of violence during the wars in his Universal History as well as in his epic.

This paper will examine some instances of Agrippa d’Aubigné’s representation of cruelty in his epic, and trace the relationship between these representations and authorial cruelty towards the reader, in the form of aggressive interrogation and manipulation by the authorial persona. I propose to examine how this cruelty might function as a spur to empathy, forcing the reader to face and at least try to understand the suffering of the victims of war and of religious persecution. This strategy is supported by strategic perversion of some of the most cherished literary forms

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7 Ibid., 3.3.3, 5.
9 In the 1749 Challoner revision based on the original 1582 version, translated from the Latin Vulgate.
of the period, in particular Petrarchan poetry and classical epic. Agrippa d’Aubigné creates certain expectations by the use of well-known Petrarchan and epic images and forms, and then destroys those expectations by twisting the images and forms to very different uses. In this way, the reader is continually kept off-balance, shocked and perhaps even distressed by what s/he reads; and this is the goal stated by the authorial persona throughout his epic.

In the end, by acting in what seems to be an inhumane manner towards his reader, Agrippa d’Aubigné may be revealing an “ethics of affect” in that reader, inculcating empathy through shared suffering and vulnerability. His emphasis on the suffering of mothers and children throughout the epic would support this reading, underscoring not only the vulnerability of these groups, but also the destruction of the one relationship almost all of his readers would have experienced. In deploying all of these strategies for upsetting the reader’s expectations, d’Aubigné seems to be searching for ways to convey a deeper understanding of the horrors of war, one that operates on an emotional and perhaps even physiological level, and that teaches in a more immediate manner how to feel the pain and suffering of others. In this way, he seeks to convert those who have chosen cruelty as a \textit{modus operandi} to a more empathetic and ethical mode of thinking.

\textbf{Paul H. Mason}

The University of Sydney

\textbf{Day 1, 14.45, L1 Lecture Theatre}

\textbf{Autotelism, degeneracy and choreutic cognition: Key features of humanly organised expression that shape cultural transmission.}

How do embodied repertoires of sound and movement become globalised? Cognitive and physical capabilities shape cultural transmission. The intrinsic properties of an expressive system also play a role. Through a comparative approach, this presentation examines the integrity of humanly organised expressive systems as they are sustained by translocal communities of practitioners. Three genres of combat-dancing are taken as case examples—(1) West Sumatran Silek, (2) West Javanese Pencak Silat Seni, and (3) Afro-Brazilian Capoeira. (1) Among the Minangkabau of West Sumatra, the improvisatory art of Silek arose through a pedagogy tied to matrilineality. Traditional Minangkabau music and Silek movement come together in performance but unfold in parallel and independent planes. Silek has not become widely popular outside West Sumatra and where it has been exported, musical accompaniment has not yet followed. (2) In West Java, the choreographed art of Pencak Silat Seni became systematised through patronage from the Sundanese social elite. In performance, specialised music ensembles animate the bodily movements of Pencak Silat Seni with corresponding musical accompaniment. Pencak Silat Seni has enjoyed a modest degree of global popularity, but only in recent years have foreign practitioners taken an active interest in learning the musical accompaniment. (3) In Brazil, the Afro-Brazilian art of Capoeira is improvised and became popular despite oppression from the political elite. Rhythmic percussion played by the Capoeira practitioners themselves guides the pace and repertoire of physical movement during performances. Capoeira has become widely popular across the globe with international practitioners becoming adept at both the movement and the music. A comparison of the globalisation of these three genres of combat-dancing reveals three processes that play a pivotal role in the cultural transmission of humanly organised expression: (a) autotelism, (b) degeneracy, and (c) choreutic cognition. (a) Autotelism, a term from psychology, refers to the self-generating, self-contained and self-sustaining character of an activity. Embodied repertoires that are autotelic are more robust across diverse contexts because they are not reliant on fixed cultural conditions for their rewards. (b) Degeneracy, a term from complex systems biology, refers to the multimodal correspondences between bodily movement and musical sound. Degenerate expressive systems that exhibit strong interactions between sound and gesture are more easily perceived, appreciated, and acquired. (c) Choreutic cognition refers to the improvised or choreographed modes of embodied cognition that involve the nonverbal, spatial, and temporal exploration, selection and development of intrasubjective and intersubjective bodily movement. Improvised pedagogical systems are time-consuming but individual students gain a wider range of physical skill, while choreographed pedagogies are efficient modes of cultural transmission to teach large numbers of students set routines. Drawing upon different modes of choreutic cognition, the processes of improvisation and choreography can either constrain or catalyse the global distribution of humanly organised expressive systems. In the context of globalisation, humanly organised expressive systems that are self-perpetuating and self-rewarding, exhibit multimodal degeneracy, and capitalise upon the choreutic cognitive learning processes of the embodied brain spread swiftly, robustly, and widely.
Andrew Mellas  
The University of Sydney  
Day 1, 11.45, L3 Seminar Room

Liturgical emotions: The affective mysticism of Byzantine hymnography.

This mystical dimension of reasonable worship and liturgical feeling has intriguing implications for the history of emotions in Byzantium. Liturgical commentaries portrayed the singing of hymns in Byzantium as a sacramental act wherein the performance of hymnography mirrored and shaped the passions of the singer’s soul. Indeed, the project of Christianity was not deaf to the ontology of music and its emotive power, especially with regard to the passions. Although hymns often dramatised narratives where depraved passions disfigured the beauty of the mind, liturgical song sought to arouse blessed passions that could awaken the mind and turn it back to its ancient beauty. According to Maximus the Confessor’s seventh-century commentary On Ecclesiastical Mystagogy, the liturgy and its hymns transformed passions, placing them within an eschatological context. Psalmody evoked compunction and quelled demonic passions, creating prudent pleasure for salvation.

This paper explores how Byzantine hymns conceived the relation between cognition and emotion in the sacred drama that their performance enacted. As well as the text of a hymn, the sacred space and soundscape that framed its performance will be meaningful considerations. We will examine and reimagine the performance of a kontakion by Romanos the Melodist – ‘On the victory of the cross’ – in early Byzantium. Although the performance of the kontakion does not exist in any audiovisual archive, its dramatic dialogue was contained in liturgical texts and its setting was described in contemporaneous accounts. Elements of its broader liturgical context can also be gleaned from texts such as Paul the Silentiary’s ekphrasis of Hagia Sophia. After all, Byzantine hymns were an integral part of a liturgical tradition that animated image, building, sound and light. Through a multimodal perspective that is conscious of the multisensory nature of liturgical action, this paper will investigate the affective mysticism of Byzantine hymnography.

Rebecca Noble  
The University of Warwick, UK  
Day 2, 14.45, L5 Meeting Room

Madness and selfhood in Bourbon Mexico.

This paper is based on a wider project examining the concept of madness in Bourbon Mexico. Engaging with scholarship on the histories of madness, emotions, scientific discourse and selfhood, the paper explores medical authors’ theories of mind and body in eighteenth-century Mexico, and the incorporation of moral elements of madness into medical observation and regulation. I suggest that these developments fundamentally affected the construction and management of the self. Learned authors placed an increasing emphasis on the role of individual conscience, preventative medicine, and self-regulation in the second half of the eighteenth century. This led to a greater focus on morality when considering what it was to be mad and human in medical texts.

Crucially, the transformation of medical and philosophical reasoning, whereby madness was considered to be a subject of empirical enquiry, affected how individuals were understood and consequently governed within society. Thus medicine became more influential in dictating accepted behaviours and provided a new focus on preventative medicine and individual responsibility for one’s own health. Madness and emotions therefore became intrinsically linked with ideas of self-regulation.

In order to discuss how madness and related emotional experiences were understood, this paper draws on Juan de Esteyneffer’s Anthology of all illnesses, published in Mexico in 1712, and Juan Manuel Venegas’ Compendium of Medicine or Medical Practice, published in Mexico in 1788. These sources illustrate the interplay of humoral and psychological theories of the mind and body during this period.

The texts outlined are used to ask the following questions: what forms of reasoning shaped beliefs about madness? How did developments in natural philosophy regarding the body, mind and soul alter how madness was understood and experienced? Finally, what do changing eighteenth-century understandings of madness tell us about the historicity of emotional and cognitive phenomena?
“Piercing the ear of grief”: (De)Constructing early modern grief and sadness by exploring Shakespearean theatre.

Bridget Escolme argues in Emotional Excess on the Shakespearean Stage that ‘grief and sorrow have a potentially interrogatory, even subversive politics, which, in the theatre, can be explored, staged, produced in excess of what is legitimated, valued, or permitted by society and culture more generally.’ The theatre affords a shared space of relative safety which allows this interrogation in a variety of recognizable situations. The familiar space invites identification and understanding from the audience which is critical as Fuchs and Koch suggest in ‘Embodied Affectivity: On Moving and Being Moved,’ Frontiers in Psychology, ‘Just as there is no cognition without emotion, at least in the sense of emotionally driven attention and interest, there is also no emotion without a cognitive grasp of the given situation.’

Love’s Labour’s Lost, stages a number of different moments of grieving which allow for the exploration of early modern understanding of the mind/body relationship and value of resilience. Berowne suggests for example that human experience can be overwhelmed by grief, forestalling the mind’s ability to compute the other demands. The bereaved Princess complains of a heavy heart that has slowed down her tongue. Her grief is expressed in highly embodied terms. Berowne advises that ‘Honest plain words best pierce the ear of grief/ And by these badges understand the King (5.2.747-8). In an earlier moment in the play, Boyet offers a similar model of grief when he anticipates the effect of the ladies behaviour on the men. He argues ‘that contempt will kill the speaker’s heart/ And quite divorce his memory from his part (5.2.149-150).

Berowne and Boyet both demonstrate the intertwined nature of the mind-body in their understanding of grieving. The King, however, moots an alternative model that asks the Princess to mourn while not forsaking the amorous advances of the King. We can conclude from the differences in understanding that grief is sui generis, resisting universality. These particular examples come from a Shakespearean comedy, albeit with it sorrowful complications, but, there are more diverse explorations of grief particularly in the tragedies and the history plays. Indeed, grief is often described in this period in somatic terms, for example, Richard II can “taste grief”, Richard II, 3.1.176.

George A. Bonnano, in ‘Loss, Trauma, and Human Resilience: Have We Underestimated the Human Capacity to Thrive After Extremely Aversive Events?’, American Psychologist, suggests that resilience in grief and the variety of ways it is negotiated is a more common human response to loss and trauma than more extreme displays of depression and sorrow. This paper aims to explore the resilient and the non-resilient grief sufferer through the lens of early modern theatre. I will consider whether the theatrical experience provides a safe haven where the catastrophic effects of non-resilience can be enacted and witnessed. I will argue that witnessing the mind-body relationship in this space allowed the audience to consider how the mind-body relationship could be manipulated by an understanding of the processes involved.

The critical self and Medieval texts.

The relationship between cognition and emotion is usually governed by a concept of self. Increasingly, human sciences suggest that the opposition of emotion to thought is misleading; rather, emotion may well play a primary role in organizing cognitive capabilities. Reorganising our concepts of self to accommodate this shift has implications for our understanding of language. In the case of historical scholarship, these implications affect our relationship with texts from past periods.

In research into the medieval period, heavy demands are placed on texts. In the discipline of literary studies, historicist research seeks through nuanced and sophisticated methodologies to produce readings that are sensitive to their historical contexts. The ambitions of such reading practices extend to the retrieval of substantial insights into non-linguistic, extra-textual aspects of medieval culture, what Paul Strohm describes as “a residue of phenomena unvoiced or uncommented upon” (Theory and the Pre-modern Text, 33). And yet, without interrogating our own assumptions about the parameters, limitations and contours of language as it relates to cognition and emotion, these investigations arguably generate foregone conclusions that depend upon an unexamined privileging of language.
Critiques of the discursive reductionism of social constructionist theories are relevant here, but our thinking about critical reading practices is also profitably extended by looking not just externally to language as a product or object, but inwardly, to language as a dynamic process. Interdisciplinary work on cognition and emotions has enhanced our knowledge of how language is processed within the self; when thinking about textual analysis, this opening up of the relationship of the reader to what is read shifts the focus to what we might be bringing to, rather than taking from, the text. Our inattention to the structure of the modern critical reading self and its processes of meaning making potentially impede our efforts to be historically sensitive.

I will exemplify these ideas with reference to John Lydgate’s “Prologue” to The Siege of Thebes. In the critical reception of this text, the separation of its body humour from consideration of its historically specific context owes more to modern partitioning of self into body, mind and emotion than to the challenges presented by the cultural moment of the text.

Elizabeth Reid
Macquarie University
Day 2, 15.15, L1 Lecture Theatre

Observation and empathy in Fifteenth-Century Italy.

I will argue that twenty-first century neuro-psychological studies lend credence to the observational knowledge of fifteenth-century scholars in explaining people’s empathetic responses to visual stimulus. According to pre-sixteenth-century knowledge, the brain operated on a ventricular system that mediated sensation and memory through reason. Humanists argued that memory, and thereby the construction of moral identity, was best aided through sensory engagement and that the most effective of the senses was sight. This belief influenced pedagogic practices, notably through painterly composition and through self-fashioning. Paintings of human figures lent physical form to moral concepts, intended to be emotively animated in the mind and imitated in the body of the viewer. Elite artistic commentators and practitioners of ‘the long fifteenth century,’ including Francesco Barbaro (1390-1454), Leon Battista Alberti (1404-1472) and Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519) encouraged artists to pursue greater knowledge of the movement and composition of the body to convincingly represent figures’ posture and facial expressions. They believed that observing and understanding emotional states and their accompanying physical sensations would ‘move’ their audience both physically and emotionally and thereby encourage identification and empathy with the subject. For instance graphic depictions of the Crucifixion sought to inspire visceral identification with Christ’s body while the figures depicted around the cross modelled the humble and devout behaviour expected of the Christian viewer. The observers’ store of sensory and socio-cultural memory informed their ability to attribute meaning to and empathise with observed actions. Theologians, poets and humanists likewise encouraged parents to carefully control their own appearance and actions in sight of their children so that the children would observe and learn to recognise and imitate appropriate moral behaviour. These practices accord with recent findings that observing other people’s actions and facial expressions generates a somatosensory response in the viewer associated with a range of emotional states. Studies argue that the human ability to recognise, imitate and empathise with the emotions of others is derived from a combination of cognitive systems, cultural expectations and personal experiences. Investigations of the mirror neuron system seek to demonstrate associations between observation with reflexive physical and empathetic responses. In this presentation I will examine the cultural and historical context of written and visual evidence, enhanced by recent findings about human cognition and emotion, to investigate intersections between psychological, social and embodied components of moral identity formation in Renaissance Italy.

Alison Searle
The University of Sydney
Day 2, 12.15, L5 Meeting Room

Cognition and emotion in the pastoral letters of Samuel Rutherford and Richard Baxter.

Pastoral care for ministers within the puritan tradition (broadly construed) in early modern England and Scotland involved a detailed attention to the intellect, body and emotions of their parishioners. Some, like Richard Baxter (1615-91) at Kidderminster, offered medical as well as spiritual care for a period to the poorer members of their parish. Frequent changes in civil and ecclesiastical governance – such as the reintroduction of episcopalianism in Scotland under James I and the Act of Uniformity (1662) in England following the Restoration of Charles II – meant that ‘the hotter sort of protestant’ often found themselves unable to continue their pastoral vocation within the state church. This was the case for the Scottish Covenanter, Samuel Rutherford (c. 1600–1661), who
was exiled from his parish of Anwoth to Aberdeen in 1630 for his nonconformist activities. Similarly, in 1660, Baxter was unwilling to subscribe to the new church settlement following the Restoration and thus had to leave his successful Interregnum ministry in Kidderminster. However, both Rutherford and Baxter continued their pastoral ministry to former parishioners and other correspondents through extensive epistolary networks.

The letter in early modern Britain was a unique artefact: material, textual, political, straddling the personal and public spheres and easily transportable. In this paper I explore the ways in which Rutherford (c. 370 letters) and Baxter (c. 1300 letters) used the letter to shape the minds and hearts of correspondents from the barely literate (London apprentices) to the nobility (the Earl of Lauderdale and Jane Campbell, sister of Lord Lorne). Each were renowned for their preaching and, as Rutherford notes in one letter, ‘My dumb Sabbaths stick in my throat’. Both saw the letter as a method of continuing their pastoral ministry when their religious nonconformity meant that other channels were closed. These letters exemplify the gospel passion, casuistical experience and acumen, scholarly learning, political influence and emotional rhetoric for which each, in their own way, were renowned (or notorious) amongst their contemporaries. Through a close reading of a selection of their surviving correspondence, I will analyse how Rutherford and Baxter enacted their pastoral vocations using letters. They addressed the spiritual, physical and intellectual needs of their correspondents as part of a complex whole. Using a range of linguistic registers that required a fine, at times tense, balance between cognition and emotion they aimed at the conversion and spiritual transformation of the hearts and lives of those to whom they wrote.

Ray Schrire
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

Day 3, 12.45, L3 Seminar Room

Between print and marginalia: Examining the cognitive implications of learning Latin in Early Modern England.

In this paper I investigate the cognitive aspects of grammar school education in 16th and 17th century England. I do this by reconstructing the cognitive ecology of the early modern classroom, focusing on the principal part of the Renaissance curriculum, namely, the study of Latin. I examine evidence on two different levels: On the level of tools, I analyse the cognitive implications of personally-owned textbooks. By tracing changes in their didactic approaches, structure and graphic layout, I identify the aims and methods through which the mind of young English boys was to be formed. Then, on the level of practice, I enquire into the cognitive habits reflected in the margins of the books of more than one hundred students. Regarding marginalia as traces of thought processes, I discuss how students actually faced the challenge of learning a foreign language. By juxtaposing these findings - tools designed by teachers and printers, with practices performed by young students – it is possible to sketch a vivid picture of cognition in the early modern classroom. The points of convergence and divergence between these two different levels of analysis make it possible to see how certain literacies and patterns of thought were introduced to and permeated through English society.

Focusing on the early modern classroom is an exceptionally fruitful case study in the field of cognitive history. As in many educational environments, structuring the thought of young students was an explicit intention of grammar school pedagogy. As education was tightly bound to specific social, intellectual, and political settings, it becomes possible to closely examine the relations between cognition and other historical circumstances. Moreover, because schooling was performed in habitual practices and methods, one is able to reconstruct quite accurately the cognitive ecology of the classroom. One can investigate how thought was formed in, and influenced by, relatively well-defined practices and habits. In addition, as he instruction of Latin lay at the core of grammar school education, and because of the close link between language and thought, concentrating on the cognitive aspects of the study of Latin allows us to learn about patterns of thought which were relatively broad in their scope and profound in their impact. Finally, due to the power of print to reproduce affordable, personal textbooks, focusing on the early modern classroom enables an exploration of a cognitive ecology in transition. The examination of specific print and manuscript cultures that I conduct in my study is precisely directed at better understanding this transition.

This paper is part of a larger on-going PhD project devoted to a cognitive history of early modern England. In my project as a whole I examine how certain literacies were introduced and accepted in broad areas of English society, in educational settings and beyond. I hope that by taking part in a multidisciplinary conference devoted to the study of the ways the mind has become transformed in history, I will be able to both learn and contribute to the conversation.
Feigning feeling: Susanna Centlivre’s imitative comedy.

This paper will examine Susanna Centlivre’s early eighteenth-century comedy. Centlivre developed an interpretation of what I call the “mimic-type,” a character that emerges in the Restoration as a negative type, a “Wou’dbe” in Centlivre’s 1706 Love at a Venture, or a “Witwoud,” as he is best known in Congreve’s Way of the World (1700). Centlivre’s iteration of the mimic-type creates a character whose capacity for imitation in the end upturns the problematic affectations of blocking characters. Fainwell, the hero of her most popular play, A Bold Stroke for a Wife (1718), is her most important version of this type, though the type appears in various forms in other plays: as Belair in Love at a Venture (1706); as Joneton in Marplot in Lisbon (1710); and as Fainwell (again!) in The Artifice (1722). Fainwell’s Protean abilities, I argue, overturn the generic norms of humours comedy along with the ancient model of temperament, the humoral system, replacing them with the new humane genre of comedy and a new model of the self, both organised around mimicry.

Centlivre deploys this vision of the Protean playwright-figure against the humours plot, carving out a place for the new brand of comedy that Shirley Strum Kenny would call “humane comedy,” and opposing the new, flexible hero, who can ameliorate the expression of the humours, to a harsh, Jonsonian comic world, in which the expression of the humours is poisonous and intransigent. Lisa Freeman has argued that the critical emphasis during the eighteenth century on maintaining or rescuing some form of humours comedy is due to its characterisation as a nationalist genre. The rise of sentimental comedy was seen to threaten “the very basis of liberty in the English nation.” I will argue, not simply that Centlivre deliberately renovates comic genre in order to contrast humours comedy, but also that her new formal commitments emphasize the uniformity of the passions and their capacity, in her view, to promote social cohesion, sociable connection, and to correct social interaction in a new global market economy. This sociable vision is grounded on Centlivre’s determined yoking of new comic genre to new social feeling and new models of imitative selfhood.

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1 Lisa A. Freeman, Character’s Theater: Genre and Identity on the Eighteenth-Century English Stage (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 211.
Christian antiquity (the *Ratio verae theologiae*, 1518/19), presents an obvious challenge to any would-be encompassing ‘cognitive history’ of a European (early) modernity traditionally seen as characterised by Renaissance(s) and Reformation(s). Drawing from the rich scholarship that has sprung up in recent decades around the English (Toronto) and Latin (Amsterdam) collected editions of Erasmus’ works, this paper will outline an account of his New Testament as—in the terms provisionally set by members of the McGill-based ‘Early Modern Conversions’ project—a literary-hermeneutical ‘conversion machine’ geared and tuned to move many minds. To (re)mark the year and a conference-venue in the South Seas, it will also sketch some parallels with a partly cognate piece of Latin cognitive engineering and navigation, Thomas More’s *Utopia* (1516).

Anik Waldow  
The University of Sydney  
**Day 3, 12.15, L5 Meeting Room**

**Hume on the sympathetic evolution of human nature.**

For Hume our fellow feeling is a “principle in human nature”, something that cannot be explained any further (EPM 5.17, n.19; SBN 219). To ask “why we have humanity or a fellow feeling with others” would therefore make no sense, since “we have to stop somewhere in our examination of causes” (ibid.). The claim that our fellow feeling is fundamental to human nature also figures in Hume’s account of the “fictitious” state of nature (T 3.2.2.15; SBN 493). Although denying that “cordial affection, compassion, [and] sympathy” (T 3.2.2.15; SBN 494) are what originally drove us to establish the virtue of justice, he nevertheless stresses that concern for others is part of our original psychological make-up.

In this paper I argue that Hume’s account of sympathy provides us with a good example of how we can think of moral capacities as natural and yet as acquired through the mind’s interactions with its environment. Thus for him it is through the mechanism of sympathy and its regular functioning that we are pushed towards the development of moral capacities that take us beyond what was originally given to us. Nature, in the form of our untutored sympathy, thereby becomes the cause that has as its regular effect our ability to judge form a moral point of view. Due to this causal link, capacities essential for the assessment of morality must be seen as being natural, and this is so even though they have been acquired through an engagement with the artifices of society, history and culture. Importantly, being natural here does not mean that moral capacities are just given in the sense that we are born with them. Rather, the claim is that we acquire them, while the process of acquisition is taken to be natural insofar in that it unfolds spontaneously when our naturally responsive human nature is placed in specific environmental conditions.

Most commentators accept that for Hume our capacity to engage with historical and cultural difference as a form of social learning is grounded in and enabled by our natural affective susceptibility to others. Yet what they stress is that, strictly speaking, the capacity to judge morals is acquired through. They thereby contrast the naturalness of sympathy with “artificially” cultivated moral capacities. By pointing to the causal link between natural and refined moral sympathy, this essay argues that the claim that our capacity for moral judgement is acquired through social learning is perfectly compatible with the claim that this capacity is natural. The reason for this is that for Hume it is part of the natural functioning of sympathy that it extends itself through our engagement with history and society.

The conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that we should be very cautious when references to human nature are used to stress that certain emotional and moral dispositions are simply given and for this reason cannot change. Human nature, as Hume stresses, shapes itself incessantly through the manner in which it experiences and interacts with its environment. What this means is that human nature is essentially responsive and malleable, and that it is precisely because of this feature of ourselves that the emergence of moral capacities can be deemed natural.

Gabriel Watts  
The University of Sydney  
**Day 3, 12.45, L5 Meeting Room**

**Hume on the irrationality of religious passions.**

David Hume famously denies that any passion is irrational in itself. The argument he gives in his *Treatise of Human Nature* (1739-40) runs as follows: passions, qua feelings, do not represent anything; therefore it is impossible for them to be true or false representations of anything. Reason is the faculty that discerns relations of truth and falsity; therefore no passion can ever be irrational - qua a false representation of some state of affairs.

Yet alongside this negative claim, Hume also makes the positive assertion that passions may be “called
Regardless of whether they consider it defensible, philosophers have understood Hume’s negative claim to be of great importance. By comparison, they tend to treat his positive claim as fairly quotidian: for it seems quite obvious that if passions are founded upon false suppositions, then they are indeed “contrary to reason” in the manner Hume describes. The thought I want to develop here, however, is that Hume’s positive claim is also of considerable philosophical importance. And I want to do so by setting out two key contexts for understanding why Hume makes it.

The first of these regards the positioning of Hume’s claim within the text of the Treatise itself. For Hume sets out his positive assertion having first presented a detailed account of our self- and other-appraising passions. What I hope to show is that Hume’s account of these passions entails the conclusion, drawn obliquely by Hume, that a metaphysically necessary connection between an agent’s intentions and the moral approbation or disapprobation of that agent is not something that ‘really exists’. Rather, the belief that there is a metaphysically necessary connection between an agent’s intentions and one’s sentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation is a false belief that is produced by the effect of custom upon the mind.

Yet, if this is correct, then any passions that are “founded upon the supposition of the existence” of such a connection, may be justly “called unreasonable.” Here I claim that such a supposition is fundamental to the thesis of providential naturalism, in which the end towards which God uses our passions as means is to increase the metaphysical resemblance between Himself and us: a position I make out by sampling the work of two of Hume’s major influences: Nicholas Malebranche and Francis Hutcheson. With these points in place, I conclude that Hume’s claim regarding when passions may be called unreasonable implies that the passions arising from this religious anthropology (e.g. the fear of damnation and hope of salvation) may be justly called irrational.

Be that as it may, Classical Hebrew prose and poetry is replete with poignant expressions of emotion, ranging from the extremes of anguish to exuberant joy. In such cases it was usual practice to use embodied metaphors to describe the physical sensations that we tend to associate with emotional experiences: e.g. ‘my soul is bowed down upon me’; ‘my kidneys will exult’; ‘all my bones will say, “Y HWH, who is like you?”’; and ‘my anger (lit. my nose) burns’.

The paper will take as its point of departure the lexicalised metaphor ‘the heart of your servant was sick’, which occurs in the midst of an agonised and impassioned outburst, in the context of a personal letter (Lachish Ostracon 3, ca. 586 BCE). It will be argued that this pragmatic function is vital for understanding how such emotional experiences were perceived, since the pathos of the expression is predicated on the ability of the recipient to empathise with the subjective experience of the sender. In other words, by using the metaphor the sender could (and evidently did) expect the recipient to understand his meaning. Consequently, given the widespread use of such metaphors, it seems reasonable to infer that the ancient Israelites held the seat of emotions to be internal and that emotional experiences were essentially universal.

The paper will then examine a range of similar embodied metaphors, which occur throughout the Hebrew Bible, together with cognate metaphors in other languages (e.g. ‘I am sick at heart’, Hamlet 1.1.10). These will be considered with reference to the work of cognitive linguists such as Zoltán Kövecses, who argue that embodied metaphors are a necessary and universal feature of the human conceptualisation and processing of emotion.
Significantly, this comparative approach suggests that the emotional experiences described by the Classical Hebrew writers are more or less analogous to our own, inasmuch as the poignancy of the metaphors lies precisely in the fact that we ‘moderns’ feel we can identify and empathise with them. To be sure, there is a danger that in interpreting such expressions we will anachronistically transfer sensations and concerns other than those experienced by the authors; but this is mitigated by the universal nature of such metaphors, which suggests that the experiences are phenomenologically related.

Carol J. Williams
Monash University
Day 1, 12.15, L3 Seminar Room

Song, the sounding relation of cognition and emotion.

At its most fundamental, the performed relation of words and music is song. Since earliest times philosophers, theorists and creative artists have understood the words to bear the message, the cognitive element, and music to add the melodic, emotive element. It is the balance between these two elements which has given rise to considerable, often vitriolic, debate from Aristotle to Pope John XXII. In this paper I will examine song in the abstract as it was discussed by the 11th century Saint Denis, the consistent defence for the necessity of the poetic and emotive in the composing and hearing of song. Then song, but more specifically sounding chant, will be considered as it was discussed by the 11th century theorist Guido of Arezzo, the 13th century Thomas Aquinas and the early 14th century Guy of Saint-Denis. Over this long stretch of time from Aristotle to Guy of Saint Denis, the consistent defence for the necessary relationship of the cognitive and emotive elements in song uses the distinction between man and the beasts. Being moved by sounding music is a trait shared with animals, but human listening differs in being more receptive to music’s effects and able to deploy reason to judge their goodness.

Stephen Wittek
McGill University, Canada
Day 2, 14.45, L1 Lecture Theatre

Conversional thinking on the London stage.

Since 2013, researchers for the Early Modern Conversions project have been working to cultivate a better understanding of the marked rise in conversional thought and activity that spread across Europe in connection to formative developments such as the Reformation, colonial operations in the New World, and increased interaction between previously isolated peoples and economies. In contrast to the vast majority of foregoing scholarship on conversional phenomena, we have aimed to move beyond an exclusive focus on religious conversion, and to attend in particular to cases where conversional thinking drifts into other contexts, or provides the definitional framework for other sorts of changes. As grounds for this approach, we note that, in addition to shifts in confessional allegiance, early moderns also used the structures and tropes of conversion to articulate changes in politics, behavior, morality, class, gender, material composition, and multiple other categories of human understanding or belonging. Nevertheless, while it seems clear that conversional thinking had a unique resonance and conceptual utility in the period, it is an altogether more difficult matter to say what conversion itself actually is, if it is not always religious. To address this difficulty, we have begun to ask questions calculated to tease out general patterns, tensions, and norms: What counts as a conversion in early modernity, and why? How can one know if a conversion has taken place?

One way of approaching these questions is to begin with the observation that conversion is emotional, and becomes comprehensible through various forms of emotional expression. To make the same point in more precise terms, one might say that the constitutive proof of normative conversional experience hinges on a feeling that a subject has turned toward a new state that is somehow better, more authentic, or more fulfilling. Another, related, approach is to work forward from the argument that, insofar as conversion is emotional, it is also cognitive, or more accurately, it proceeds from a fluid cognitive process that may, in various instantiations, become manifest as emotion, sensation, or conscious thought. To prise open a better view of the emotional and cognitive dimension of conversional thinking, researchers for the Early Modern Conversions project have begun to consider what one might learn by analyzing the contexts and implements...
of conversion in terms of a ‘cognitive ecology,’ a framework that posits cognition, not as a metaphysical process emanating exclusively from a human brain, but as a process that inheres in a system of soft-assembled material resources that extends beyond the confines of the skull and body. Accordingly, in addition to asking questions about the normative patterns and ontology of conversion, we also focus attention on the spaces and material affordances that early moderns used to feel, know, and show that a conversion had taken place.

This paper I propose for the Moving Minds conference will offer a framework for understanding the relation between conversion and another key structure of early modern thought: theatrical performance. Taking early modern London as a specific focus, my analysis will consider the embeddedment of conversational thinking within the city’s concentration of media resources, with particular emphasis on the ability of theatrical affordances to facilitate creative experimentation and critical examination around received categories of identity. The text I will analyze most closely is Dekker and Middleton’s The Honest Whore, but the analysis also applies more generally to the theatrical culture and broader media environment of early modern London.

Many today would have us believe that an emotional encounter with the material of history interferes with perception and thus corrupts its purpose. Yet, school curricula regularly identify empathy as one of the key skills required and cultivated by the discipline. Are we really in the business of teaching empathy? Or of stripping it out of our engagement with the past?

To overcome these entrenched prejudices against an emotional reading of the past, we ought to be mindful of current research into the place of emotion in cognition (for example, in recollection), to make use of developments within phenomenology (Zahavi) and resources within psychoanalysis. This requires becoming aware of the emotional entanglement involved in receiving other people’s memories and viewing it not simply as an impediment to historical analysis, but as its ally and tool. This paper will set out an account of the historical prejudice against subjective engagements with the past and propose some resolutions to this drawn from cognitive science, phenomenology, and psychology.


Rachel Yuen-Collingridge
Macquarie University
Day 1, 11.45, L5 Meeting Room

A sentimental journey: Objectivity and subjectivity in historical method.

When asked to describe the purpose and method of history, students and scholars alike plot their responses against the axes of subjectivity and objectivity, often demonising the former as the unkempt domain of emotion. According to the popular myth, the modernisation of the discipline may be viewed as a transition from subjectivity to objectivity, from a personal and emotional engagement to one of dispassionate reasoning aimed at an eternal and universal truth. By this narrative, history is assimilated to science – or rather to a science of history’s imagining, one firmly rooted in the nineteenth century settlement of Enlightenment turmoils. The fate of the emotional experience of the past is side-lined in favour of processes which formalise and idealise the distance between observer and observed. The proliferation of *instrumenta* (microscopes, maps, diagrams, statistics; see Daston/Galison) offered a kind of prelapsarian purity of vision: the world unmuddied by affect. Newspapers hijacked this distinction, dressed it up with polemic and embedded it into popular consciousness.